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Imagine a universe without human beings. Now imagine a universe devoid of any 
creatures like human beings, beings who could think about the universe and in so doing 
consider it as divided up into different kinds of things that could be objects of 
understanding. Now imagine - this is harder - your not being there, or anyone else, to 
imagine such a universe. Next think about setting about describing in physical laws such 
a universe in line with a completist physicalist program: that all the facts about the world 
are physical facts. But where would one begin? Why would one begin? Remember there 
is no-one around to take more interest in any part of the universe than any other. This 
contrasts with what we do now. What we do now is take chunks of the universe - stars, 
planets, water, trees, air, particles - and demarcate the physical laws in such a way as to 
explain how these objects behave against a background of other objects and ultimately 
the universe as a whole. But what if we were not around? Why would we there be any 
reason to demarcate groups of physical laws in this or any other way? My suggestion is 
that there would be none. The grouping of the physical laws to form complex classes and 
layers of explanations (how trees and water are related; how planets move as part of a 
solar system) is parasitic upon creatures having particular interests giving them a 
perspective (‘perspective’ is being used here in a somewhat technical sense) upon the 
universe or world, which in turn derives from the kind of limited creatures they happen to 
be. But the perspective itself is not a physical fact about the universe. Rather it is a way 
of coming to form a system of facts about the universe. Further, not only might the 
perspective have been otherwise, there might be none at all. In which case the 
demarcation of physical laws, given meaning by their application to entities picked out as 
having a certain significance to us, would not get off the ground. At best there might be a 
random bunching of laws covering regions of the universe. But such random bunchings 
would have no meaning; they would be unintelligible; they wouldn’t really be about 
anything. For laws to be about things you have to have limited creatures who differentiate 
between parts of the universe, and for whom different parts have a variable significance 
and value. Things stand out for them; they literally exist.
1
 Without such creatures, things 
we take for granted would, in the literal sense, not exist. It is the very limitedness of our 
perspective and capabilities, such that things are problems for us, and wherefore we 
literally or metaphorically bump into things, that brings objects into existence for us. 
Otherwise the universe would be utterly ‘flat’ and undifferentiated. A limitation of 
perspective is required for there to be objects of thought, and thus for thought itself. Thus, 
the intelligibility of the laws of physics is logically parasitic upon our having varying 
interests in different segments of the universe. 
Physicalists, it is contended, presuppose or help themselves to the way the world 
divides itself up for us in being able to group the laws such that they are about something. 
But the way that the world divides up is not a physical fact about the world, but rather a 
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matter of, and dependent upon, our interests and our caring about some things rather than 
others, for whatever reason. In other words, physicalists draw upon and assume our 
capacity to pick things out in the world and give them significance, and then say, look, 
there is nothing but physical facts there. But this is disingenuous. Why demarcate a 
certain set of physical laws at all? That we do it one way rather than another isn’t itself a 
physical fact at all, but rather a matter of perspective born of the kind of creatures we are. 
Take trees. We as humans have an interest in trees for all sorts of reasons. But 
there is no intrinsic reason why all the trees on the earth should be regarded as separate 
from the earth out of which the trees grow. It’s perfectly conceivable that there might be 
an entity conceptualised as a tree-earth. We don’t do that (usually) because we have a 
reason and interest in separating the two. There are bunches of physical laws that 
describe regions of the universe; but you could rearrange these into different sets about 
other entities as a result of creatures with different interests. But if there are no creatures 
with any interests, you wouldn’t have any reason to group the laws into sets at all; at best 
if you did so gather them they would be meaningless and arbitrary groupings. Physical 
laws are built on a scaffolding of logically prior significances, which derive from human 
beings paying attention to some things more than other - a perspective, a point of view - 
without which there would be no objects (considered in its broadest sense) for the laws of 
physics to apply to. Without such logical prior discrimination we wouldn’t have any 
motivation to carve up the universe at all; in which case there would be nothing for the 
laws of physics individually or in complex groups to be about. There would indeed be 
nothing for us to think about.
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Take particles. Even these
3
, to be the subject of a physical law, have to be 
differentiated from their background and from other particles. There is nothing about 
physical laws themselves that could determine that physical laws have to concern 
themselves with particles. They might be conceptualised as part of a larger entity that 
included the background. We are interested in particles for all sorts of reasons; that is 
why we formulate laws about their characteristics and behaviour. 
Consider the scientific investigation into the origin of the universe. For it to be an 
object of scientific inquiry, an inquiry into the laws that may have governed such a event 
or process, there have to be creatures for whom the answer to such questions matter and 
have significance. Furthermore, the very notion of a universe, indeed of anything, having 
a beginning or for that matter an end is a product of creatures who have an interest in the 
beginnings and ends of things. The beginning (or end) of something is not itself a 
physical fact, for to mark some point as a beginning (or end) is not something that may be 
derived from a physical description of the events alone. The transition from one thing to 
another depends upon creatures who care that the demarcation is made there. There is 
nothing intrinsic about events that mean that it need be made where it is so that 
something finishes and something else starts - as far as the events are concerned in 
themselves it is a meaningless sequence of ‘just one damned thing after another’
4
 - in fact 
even to demarcate determinate things here is going too far without paying our debt to 
creatures who delineate objects. A beginning or an end is not a physical fact; they are not 
intrinsically physical concepts at all; and yet physics would be impossible without them. 
In sum, physicalists give meaning to a set of physical laws being about something 
by helping themselves to a referent that is not demarcated by physical laws. This is where 
the parasitic nature comes in. 
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What does this show? It does not show that physicalism is false. But it does show 
that it is incomplete. 
Surely, it will be said, the universe divides itself up into meaningful chunks to 
which the physical laws apply. It’s easy to think this given the habitual way we think, and 
how our interests permeate every aspect of our view of the universe. We are so used to 
how the universe seems to us that it is hard for us to imagine it seeming any other way. 
But a stretch of the imagination shows how it could be all have been very different, or 
such demarcation not there at all. The way we think about the world seems so utterly 
natural to us that we think all too easily that that how it seems to us reflects how the 
world divides itself up. But again, we can see that the way that it divides itself up is a 
product of our interests and concerns: our perspective. As a consequence we could have 
an entirely different set of physical laws relating to objects in the universe, or, if there is 
no perspective, no set of physical laws describing the universe at all, for nothing would 
be differentiated in such a manner that the laws have anything meaningful to grab onto as 
their referent. 
Returning, by way of example, to the discussion of the concepts of a beginning 
and an end, it was said that they are not intrinsically physical concepts. I might have 
chosen any number of other concepts, which I shall call facilitating concepts. It is 
important to be clear about what ‘intrinsically’ means here. Of course it may still be true 
that in describing the beginning and the end of something we can use only physical facts 
and physical laws - but that it is the beginning and the end of something that the physical 
laws are describing is not something that you find among the physical facts or physical 
laws - that depends on a prior demarcating of a segment of the universe. The meaning of 
‘beginning’ or of ‘end’ cannot be derived from any number of physical laws. The 
transition makes sense only from the point of view of creatures for whom it matters, and 
without which the event just prior to the ‘beginning’ and just after the ‘end’ would give 
no intrinsic reason to mark a distinction. This distinction may be made in various ways - 
in time, in space, with reference to certain characteristics - but in all cases it depends 
upon our being interested to chop up things in particular way. 
The upshot of all this is that physicalism needs to acknowledge its debt to logical 
prior facilitating concepts without which it couldn’t even begin, concepts which gain 
their sense only because there are creatures that have a limited perspective on the 
universe (world) that involves, for whatever reason, their paying variable attention to 
events, and in so doing their ordering them in such a way that they are given significance, 
and, in a sense, only in that way exist at all. Such facilitating concepts cannot be reduced 
to physical laws, and this contradicts the completist claim of physicalism that a complete 
description of the universe would involve only physical laws. The ability to carry out 
such description depends, contrary to what physicalist often claim, on a perspective - a 
view from somewhere, for a view from nowhere would be no view at all, and no view at 
all would give nothing for the laws of physics to be about. The contrary view carries the 
taint of hubris, albeit tacitly, that there is some ultimate perspective that is logically 
equivalent to no perspective at all; a lingering shadow of religion perhaps, suggesting that 
we may take up something like a God’s-eye perspective. We could not do physics 
without being creatures for whom the universe is not a place where everything is of equal 
significance and that would instead be presented to us as one indiscriminate homogeny; 
physics requires creatures for whom the universe is separated into significant and 
 4 
meaningful parts through their caring about some aspects of it more than others. And that 
requires creatures with limits who generate a perspective. Without that, there would 






It may be objected that my argument is akin to a blatant idealist fallacy. First, one may 
point out that the argument here is not motivated by the metaphysics of idealism. The 
way in which objects acquire significance and meaning for us is one that derives from our 
engagement and interests in the world - our way of being-in-the-world - not from a 
disinterested, possibly disembodied, mental contemplation as some empirical idealists
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might suppose. Setting that aside this as a misinterpretation, there is something to be 
learnt from looking at the classic rebuttal of empirical idealism. Usually the idealist 
argument goes like this: in conceiving of an object existing unconceived one is obviously 
conceiving of it, therefore it is impossible for an object to both exist and be unconceived.
7
 
To put it another way, in thinking of the possibility of objects existing unthought of one 
would in fact tacitly, at least, be thinking of those objects, so they would not be 
unthought-of objects but thought-of objects, and in thinking of unthought-of-objects, this 
could not be otherwise. Therefore, objects cannot exist without being thought of. Now it 
might be thought that the refutation of this is obvious
8
. This is that, while it is impossible 
for a object to exist unconceived at the same time as it is conceived of, this does not show 
that there cannot exist an unconceived-of-object at other times. A chair cannot exist 
unkicked at the same time as it is kicked, but that does nothing to show the impossibility 
of an unkicked-chair. In the same way there is no problem with there being an unthought-
of-chair. But this, I suggest, is a too swiftly draw a conclusion. 
 Insofar as the object is characterised and delineated it is essentially linked to a 
perspective. The chair is rather a revealing example. It wouldn’t make any sense to say 
there were chairs in the world if there were not objects related functionally to certain 
creatures in the way that chairs were. Of course that functional relation, at least as a 
necessary condition, is sitting down. No sitting down, no chairs. 
 It may be thought that this point at best applies only to objects that get their 
definition partly, at least, through their functional relations. But the central contention 
here is that this is not so. That a set of characteristics group to form an object cannot be 
derived from those characteristics themselves alone; there is nothing about those 
characteristics that means the supposed object should not bleed into its environment and 
become quite a different object. That it does not is because there are creatures who set 
boundaries. The distinction between functional relations and the relation to the concern of 
creatures to order their environment according to their interests, and from a certain 
perspective, is in fact spurious. It’s the same thing essentially. 
 In the sense required to be an object of thought, a mere object cannot be an object 
of thought. When we think of an object we always think of it as a certain kind of object 
delineated by characteristics. A bare ‘object’ cannot be an object of thought because it 
would not be being thought of as anything. This holds even if we are mistaken as to what 
the object of our thought is. Regardless, the object is always characterised in some way; 
as something. It is in this sense that objects depend for their existence on a thinker - 
reminding ourselves that this means a creature who is engaged in the world and has a 
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variable range of discriminating interests and values born of limitations in its capabilities, 
not just a mere omniscient contemplator for whom, in fact, thought would have no reason 
to get started. As objects thought of in a certain way objects depend upon a thinker with a 
limited perspective and capabilities. Bare ‘objects’ cannot be objects of thought at all and 
are unintelligible; there would be nothing for the thought of them to be a thought about, 
and so we cannot have thoughts about them. They could not exist as objects for us. 
 Physicalism thus depends upon creatures with a limited perspective, and not as it 
sometimes purports, to be concerned with objects-in-themselves as they would be 
regardless of any perspective. Without a limited perspective, there would be no objects 
for the laws of physics to be about. To get off the ground physics required, and continues 
to require, the logically prior facilitating concepts that may be derived only from the 
limited outlook of a creature with discriminating values and interests. 
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1
 The literal sense deriving from the Latin exsistere to stand out. 
2
 This, it seems to me, may be obliquely connected to Hume’s famous phrase that ‘Reason is, and ought 
only to be, the slave of the passions” Treatise II.3.3 415. For it applies not only to ethics, but to our 
thinking about the world in general: some things need to in fact matter to us more than others. So we might 
make Hume’s dictum stronger: ‘Reason is, and has to be, the slave of the passions.’ Reason alone would 
never give a motivation to start thinking about anything at all, nor in fact stop thinking and build limits to 
that thinking. This in turn is connected to the so-called ‘frame problem’ in artificial intelligence. See Robert 
de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotions (Cambridge MA and London: The MIT Press, 1987), and Why 
Think? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). There are of course also deep connections with the 
tradition of existential phenomenology here, as found in Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, which I 
don’t have the space to explore here. 
3
 I say this, as they are not the usual examples of what gets called ‘medium sized dry goods’. 
4
 To adapt the phrase ‘Life is just one damned thing after another’ by the American author Elbert Hubbard 
(1856-1915). The phrase is taken to mean the way that we shape our lives in a meaningful sequence of 
events. Some think this may be done to excess with grand theories of history, as found in say Hegel or 
Marx, and counter by saying, at least as a corrective to extravagance, that history is just one damned thing 
after another. 
5
  It may indeed be claimed that God thinking about anything is a contradiction, for if thinking about things 
requires a limited perspective, then God thinking about the world would involve placing limits on him - 
there would be points of view and ways of understanding about the world that were not available to Him - 
which stands in clear contradiction to what is usually regarded as His omniscient nature. So either, one 
might argue, God can’t think - what could possibly motivate an all-powerful being for which nothing was 
an obstacle or problem, creating no differential of interest? - or there is no God in the usually unlimited 
sense. We are left with either an unthinking God or a limited God. Neither horn of this is attractive, and so 
either could stand as a refutation of the existence of God as usually defined. 
6
 By ‘empirical idealist’ I am of course referring to what has been taken to be the view of Berkeley. I shall 
not enter into the controversy over the historical accuracy of this position, but rather pursue it for its 
philosophical interest regardless.  
7
 See Berkeley Principles, para. 23.  
8
 It gets a forceful and succinct presentation in J. O. Urmson, Berkeley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1982) p. 45. 
